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1. INTRODUCTION
Social reformers such as John Stuart Mill and John Dewey
have long expressed concern about a tension between democratic
principles and organizational practices that appear undemocratic.'
More recently, a substantial body of academic literature advocating
changes in organizations to make them more democratic has been
produced.2  Change has been advocated on a variety of normative
grounds. In a noteworthy recent contribution to the genre for instance,
political scientist Ian Shapiro argues that justice rightly understood is
inseparable from democracy, and argues that management should be
required to justify the business necessity of hierarchical, undemocratic
practices, much as it is currently required to demonstrate the business
necessity of practices with a racially disparate impact.
3
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See, e.g., JOHN DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION (1966); JOHN STUART
MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (1909).
2 Notable examples include ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO ECONOMIC
DEMOCRACY (1985), CAROLE PATEMAN, PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIC
THEORY (1970), and IAN SHAPIRO, DEMOCRATIC JUSTICE (1999). More popular
works in the same vein are DAVID P. ELLERMAN, THE DEMOCRATIC WORKER-
OWNED FIRM: A NEW MODEL FOR THE EAST AND WEST (1990) and DAVID EWING,
FREEDOM INSIDE THE ORGANIZATION (1977).
3 SHAPIRO, supra note 2, at 166-195.
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Over the last few decades, during the period in which
advocates of more democratic organizations have been making their
case, a counter-movement has also been active. That movement is
centered in economics and has used economic arguments to contend
that the current Anglo-American structure of corporate democracy,
with the franchise limited to shareholders, is more efficient than
employee ownership and voting, except under limited circumstances
in which employees have homogeneous interests.4 Although the
economic case against changing the current standard corporate voting
structure has not gone unanswered,5 the argument against employee
voting when employees have hierarchical interests that conflict with
those of other employees or those of investors forms a formidable
counterweight to advocacy for greater organizational democracy.
6
One response to the claim that employee voting for board
members would be inefficient is to define democracy so that no such
4 Major contributions to the literature upholding shareholder voting are HENRY
HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE (1996) and OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON,
THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRM, MARKETS, RELATIONAL
CONTRACTING (1985). See also OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF
GOVERNANCE (1996); Henry Hansmann, When Does Worker Ownership Work?
ESOPs, Law Firms, Codetermination and Economic Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1749
(1990).
5 For efforts to suggest that employee ownership would or could be efficient, see
Alan Hyde, In Defense of Employee Ownership, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 159 (1982);
R. David Kershaw, Manufacturing Survival: The Uncertain Case for the Inefficiency
of Worker Ownership (2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors).
6 Of course, underlying the debate over shareholder voting is the classic Berle-Dodd
debate over whether the corporation should be managed exclusively for the benefit
of shareholders. A.A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L.
REV. 1049 (1931); A. A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A
Note, 45 HARV. L. REV.1365 (1932); E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are
Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV.l 145 (1932). For more recent
discussions of the debate, see A. A. Sommer, Jr., Whom Should the Corporation
Serve? The Berle-Dodd Debate Revisited Sixty Years Later, 16 DEL. J. CORP. L. 33
(1991); William W. Bratton, The "Nexus of Contracts" Corporation: A Critical
Appraisal, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 407 (1989); David Millon, Communitarians,
Contractarians, and the Crisis in Corporate Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1373
(1993); David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201. See also
Thomas W. Dunfee, Corporate Governance in a Market With Morality, 62 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 129 (Summer 1999). The classic economic case for managing a
corporation solely in the interests of shareholders is Milton Friedman, The Social
Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970
(Magazine), at 32.
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voting is entailed.7 Democracy is a broad and complex concept, and
the question of what greater democracy in workplaces would entail is
correspondingly broad and complex. We do not believe that
employee voting for corporate board members is the only or even
necessarily the central criterion for organizational democracy. We do
believe, however, that a fundamental democratic principle is the
ability of a citizen to participate in the selection of leaders. This
principle stands in troubling tension with the inability of employees to
vote for corporate leaders. At the same time, we believe that to make
a case for employee voting plausible, it must acknowledge the
economic perspective rather than eliding economics in favor of other
normative perspectives. Although we strongly believe that an
economic perspective based on efficiency and rational choice is not
the only relevant normative perspective for determining the merits of a
proposal for organizational democracy, such an economic perspective
is a valid, central component of the debate over economic democracy,
and it is the perspective we employ here.
We begin our argument by demonstrating how inefficiency
arises in the context of group-based conflict and exploitation under a
system in which managers and employees as well as investors vote for
corporate leadership. However, we then go on to show that such
efficiency problems are not inherent in all forms of multi-stakeholder
voting. Indeed, we argue that in certain sorts of "group-splitting"
systems with employee voting that we shall outline the outcomes are
7 Examples of advocacy of organizational democracy that focus on matters such as
due process or participative consensus rather than employee voting, at least of an
adversarial sort, include JANE J. MANSBRIDGE, BEYOND ADVERSARY DEMOCRACY
(1983), Jane J. Mansbridge, Fear of Conflict in Face to Face Democracies, in
WORKPLACE DEMOCRACY AND SOCIAL CHANGE 125 (Frank Lindenfeld & Joyce
Rothschild-Witt eds., 1982), and Nien-he Hsieh, Justice and the Ownership and
Governance of Firms (2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors).
8 For an argument in favor of "value diversity" in corporate decision-making that
does not specify how such value diversity might be incorporated into corporate
governance procedures, see Wayne Eastman & Michael A. Santoro, The Importance
of Value Diversity in Moral Free Space, 13 BUSINESS ETHICS QUARTERLY
(forthcoming 2003, on file with authors). For a broader theory that defines moral
free space in the context of a contractarian approach to business ethics, see THOMAS
DONALDSON & THOMAS W. DUNFEE, TIES THAT BIND: A SOCIAL CONTRACTS
APPROACH To BUSINESS ETHICS (1999). Both the Eastman & Santoro and the
Donaldson & Dunfee approaches, in our view, favor enhanced corporate democracy,
though neither approach directly addresses the voting issue that is central to this
paper.
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as good or better from an efficiency perspective as those systems in
which shareholders are the sole voters.
II. GROUP INTERESTS AND INEFFICIENCY
Our argument relies heavily on the concepts of group-based
interests and of efficient as opposed to inefficient corporate policies.
Accordingly, it is important to define what we mean by these
concepts.
First, as to group-based interests: corporations are
characterized by the presence of stakeholders with cooperative but
also often conflicting interests. These stakeholders fall into groups,
such as managers, investors, and employees. Collective interests
derive from group affiliations. Although not every manager has the
same interests, it is meaningful to speak of managerial group interests
relative to those of other groups, such as non-managerial employees or
investors.
For present purposes, we leave o pen the significant question,
much discussed in the ethics literature, of whether a given group
affected by corporate actions, such as the community in which a
corporation operates, should be understood as a stakeholder whose
interests should in some fashion be taken into account in corporate
policy-making. Instead, this paper deals with three significant groups
at the center rather than at the periphery as stakeholders: equity
investors, managers, and non-managerial employees.
Our characterization of a corporation as an aggregation of
groups and their associated interests implies a definition of efficiency:
the efficient policy from the perspective of the corporation-as
distinct from the perspective of society as a whole-is the policy that
maximizes the total welfare of the various groups that comprise the
corporation. On the face of it, this multi-group definition of efficiency
might appear to be in conflict with the financial economist's
conception of efficient firm policy as the policy that maximizes the net
present value of the firm as reflected in the value of the firm's
9 R. Edward Freeman's classic discussion of stakeholder theory can be found in
STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT: A STAKEHOLDER APPROACH (1984). A thoughtful
collection of critical essays about stakeholder theory appears in 4 BUSINESS ETHICS
QUARTERLY (Oct. 1994). See also John Jordan, The Multi-Stakeholder Concept of
Organization, in PARTNERS IN ENTERPRISE: THE WORKER OWNERSHIP
PHENOMENON (Jack Quarter & George Melnyk eds., 1989).
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equity.' 0 But if we assume contractual relations between groups-a
reasonable assumption for relations among managers, employees, and
investors, though not necessarily for all other groups affected by a
firm-rather than relations characterized by externalities and an
absence of bargaining, the two definitions of efficiency are
compatible. For example, it would not be efficient in terms of either
our multi-group definition or of net present value to adopt a policy that
increased the welfare of investors by one while decreasing the welfare
of employees by three. Under our multi-group definition, such a
policy is clearly inefficient. It is also inefficient under the net present
value view, because imposing an additional cost of three on employees
will lead them to require investors to compensate them accordingly
and thereby diminish shareholder value.
Our definition of firn efficiency, though compatible with the
net present value definition-at least as related to employees, mangers,
and investors-does not in any way assume that stock prices, especially
short-term changes in stock prices, act as a signal of efficient policy
for a firm. In our view, investors, and all other groups, operate in an
environment often characterized by deep ambiguity over which policy
will enhance the aggregate value of all contracting groups making up
the firm. Given a lack of reliable information over which policy is in
fact efficient, all groups have an incentive to support policies that
favor that group relative to others in slicing up the corporate pie. As
we will discuss further in modeling firm voting procedures, investors
do in some respects have better incentives to avoid sub-optimal
decisions than employees. But given a lack of credible information on
payoffs, which we assume in our model to be the case, investors will
choose an inefficient policy that boosts their immediate return by one
while lowering that of employees by three, just as employees for their
part will choose a policy raising their welfare by one and lowering the
welfare of investors by three.
The example just given and the basic definition of efficiency in
terms of maximizing the aggregate welfare of the groups comprising
the firm further imply a definition of inefficient policy-making in a
firm. As we define it, an inefficient policy is one in which a group
with power to make policy adheres to its interest in a situation in
which it either disregards or lacks credible information as to the
1o See, e.g., RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE FINANCE (2003).
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greater interest of another group. Such a policy may also be termed
exploitative, and we refer to group-based exploitation (or
opportunism) at later points in the paper. "1
III. THE BASIC MODEL OF EMPLOYEE VOTING
Our key argument in this section is that having employees vote
along with other stakeholders-multi-stakeholder voting-produces
more efficient outcomes if investors, managers, and workers are split
internally rather than united against the other groups. We will call
multi-stakeholder voting in which the contending sides or "parties"
take positions conducive to major groups being internally divided
"group-splitting," and voting in which the contending sides take
positions conducive to those groups being internally unified "group-
based." Our contention is as follows: the existence of group-splitting
parties weeds out proposals for inefficient actions that, even though
they are advantageous to one key group in the corporation, are
unappealing to some of the swing voters who will decide the election.
Group-based parties, on the other hand, lack an incentive to weed out
such exploitation. We do not rely on any assumption that group-
splitting voting leads to different, more altruistic preferences, and
hence better outcomes because of a reduced level of selfishness. On
the contrary, we assume, in accord with the most fundamental
assumptions of the neoclassical economic model of individual
motivation, that group-splitting voting does not modify preferences in
the slightest, and, moreover, that preferences differ sharply and
primarily (or even exclusively) according to group membership rather
than according to other values. Even given such conditions, we argue
that organizing workplace voting along group-splitting rather than
1 Note that exploitation (or opportunism; we use the terms interchangeably) as
defined here does not require that the group making the decision consciously
disregard the interests of others. Lack of information as to all relevant payoffs is at
least as likely a basis for exploitative decisions, especially among equity investors,
who have an incentive to maximize the residual value of the firm. Our focus on
opportunism is indebted to Williamson's interpretation of corporate governance as a
way to reduce the costs of opportunism by individuals and groups. See OLIVER E.
WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM (1987).
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group-based lines results in the reduction of exploitative policies that
prevail under group-based politics.'
2
A model helps illustrate our claim. Suppose that a firm is
evenly divided in voting strength between two classes: bosses and
workers. (For simplicity, this initial model of politics and hierarchy
ignores investors; our second model takes them into account.) Further,
suppose that the bosses and workers must decide between various
policies for firm work arrangements. These policies, we will assume,
involve two dimensions: "egalitarianism" versus "inegalitarianism,"
and "vanguardism" versus "traditionalism." That is, the policies make
work arrangements more or less egalitarian in terms of economic and
status disparities between higher-ranking groups and lower-ranking
groups and make work arrangements more or less "vanguardist" by
infusing them with contemporary, progressive managerial thought on
the one hand, or maintaining traditional work roles and privileges on
the other. Some egalitarian and vanguardist policies are efficient,
while others are exploitative; the same applies to inegalitarian and
traditionalist policies. Efficient proposals increase the firm's welfare
(assumed here to be the sum of the welfare of bosses and workers),
while exploitative proposals reduce it. Initially, we will assume that
policy preferences divide solely along group lines. We will further
assume that workers favor egalitarian and traditionalist policies and
oppose inegalitarian and vanguardist ones, while bosses favor
inegalitarian and vanguardist policies and oppose egalitarian and
traditionalist ones.
Now assume there are two egalitarian proposals and two
inegalitarian proposals, along with two vanguardist and two
traditionalist proposals. One of each of the four types of proposals is
efficient, while the other is exploitative. We shall assume that the
12 Though the models that follow are original ones, the methodology employed has
been derived from three major sources: 1) Anthony Downs's model of competition
between parties; ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY
(1957); see also, JOHN E. ROEMER, POLITICAL COMPETITION (2001); 2) political
science literature on the value of cross-cutting cleavages in mitigating group conflict;
see, e.g., DONALD L. HOROWITZ, ETHNIC GROUPS IN CONFLICT (1985); AREND
LIJPHART, DEMOCRACY IN PLURAL SOCIETIES (1976); SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET,
POLITICAL MAN (1960); and 3) the game-theoretic literature on strategic interaction,
especially under circumstances involving imperfect information; see, e.g., DOUGLAS
G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW (1994); HERBERT GINTIS, GAME
THEORY EVOLVING (2000); THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT
(1960).
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efficient egalitarian proposal has a considerable positive value for
workers and a lesser negative value for bosses, while the exploitative
one has a fairly small positive value for workers and a large negative
value for bosses. The efficient inegalitarian proposal has a small
negative value for workers and a large positive value for bosses, and
the exploitative one has a large negative value for workers and a
smaller positive value for bosses. The efficient vanguardist proposal
has a small negative value for workers and a larger positive value for
bosses, while the opportunistic one has a large negative value for
workers and a smaller positive one for bosses. The efficient
traditionalist proposal has a fair-sized positive value for workers and a
smaller negative one for bosses, while the exploitative one has a small
positive value for workers and a large negative one for bosses.
Now we reach the crucial point, which involves comparing the
policies that will be adopted by the firm under two different political
systems. In the first system, a "boss party" and a "worker party"
compete for control. In this system, victory will depend simply on
which party is more diligent in turning out its group base, given an
initial assumption of an equal numerical division of strength between
the two groups. The boss party has no incentive to weed out the
exploitative inegalitarian and vanguardist proposals from its platform,
and the worker party equally has no incentive to weed out the
exploitative egalitarian and traditionalist proposals from its agenda. If
the boss party wins, it will carry out two efficient and two exploitative
proposals; if the worker party wins, it will also carry out two efficient
and two exploitative proposals. (In an actual firm, investor interests
may modify the incentives of boss or worker parties to exploit, as we
will discuss later; for now, the point is to see the difference between
how group-based and ideological politics work for managers and
employees, leaving investors aside.)
In the second system, a "liberal" party that favors
egalitarianism and vanguardism competes for control of the firm
against a "conservative" party that favors inegalitarianism and
traditionalism. Given the numbers above, two of the egalitarian and
vanguardist proposals favored by the liberal party are efficient and two
are inefficient. The same is true for the conservative party, whose
platform of two inegalitarian and two traditionalist proposals is
likewise split between efficient and inefficient items.
Unlike the worker and boss parties, who simply stick with
proposals favoring their side, the liberal and conservative parties do
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not rely on support from a group, but compete for votes among both
workers and bosses. To gain boss votes, the liberal party has an
incentive to jettison the inefficient egalitarian proposal from its
agenda, which makes its platform have a greater value to bosses. For
the same reason, the conservative party has an incentive to delete the
inefficient traditionalist proposal from its agenda, which makes its
platform also worth more for bosses. Also, to gain worker votes, the
liberals have an incentive to jettison their inefficient vanguardist
proposal, while the conservatives have an incentive to reject their
inefficient inegalitarian one. The outcome of this competition for
votes is the elimination of the four inefficient proposals from
consideration, which results in a two-plank liberal platform and a two-
plank conservative platform purged of inefficient proposals. 13
Whichever ideological party wins, the outcome will be
superior to that with group-based parties. Both the liberals and the
conservatives will carry out programs with a positive value for the
firm compared to a situation with group-based control. 14
What the superiority of group-splitting voting over group-
based voting depends on in this model is somewhat counterintuitive.
Group-splitting voting is better than group-based voting because we
have assumed that preferences in the workplace are in fact arrayed
along group lines rather than ideological ones. That makes
exploitation more easily accomplished by group-based parties than by
ideological parties. In a world in which the reverse is true, group-
based politics would be a protection against exploitation by
ideological parties. If preferences of workers and bosses in firm X
were solely based on ideology, with a class of liberals favoring
egalitarian and vanguardist proposals, both efficient and exploitative
ones, and a class of conservatives favoring inegalitarian and
traditionalist proposals, in order to make electoral competition work to
weed out exploitative proposals, one would want to have parties based
on some other criterion than ideology-such as support for the interests
13 It is useful to assume knowledge of payoffs to make parties quickly responsive to
voter demand. If one does not assume such knowledge, in keeping with our general
approach, the parties would still be expected to jettison inefficient proposals over
time, since a party that does not will find itself losing support relative to a party that
does.
14 Neither the liberal nor the conservative party will carry out all the efficient
proposals. The liberals will carry out efficient egalitarian and vanguard changes,
and the conservatives will carry out efficient inegalitarian and traditionalist changes,
but neither will carry out the other party's reforms.
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of bosses or workers! In such a hypothetical world, a bosses' party
that supported inegalitarian and vanguardist proposals would engage
in a desirable, efficiency-enhancing competition with a workers' party
that supported egalitarian and traditionalist ones. The alternative firm
is not on its face fantastic; there could in theory be such a place. We
believe, though, that such a firm does not now exist. The firm in our
model, in which employees see the advantages and disadvantages of
various policies from the vantage point of being workers or bosses, is,
we believe, much truer to life than an ideological firm X in which
one's identity as a worker or boss is unrelated to one's preferences.
To demonstrate how robust the advantage of group-splitting
voting over group-based voting is in weeding out inefficient policies,
we will modify our original assumption that preferences as to work
arrangements are determined solely by group membership and not at
all by ideology. A plausible assumption regarding the preferences of
individual firm members is that they are in large part a function of
group affiliation, but that ideology also plays some role. Suppose, for
example, that the workers and the bosses in a firm have different
preferences, as described before, but that both groups can be divided
into equal-sized factions of liberals, centrists, and conservatives.
"Liberals" in a group are more favorable to egalitarian and vanguardist
proposals than "centrist" group members, and less favorable to
inegalitarian and traditionalist proposals. "Conservatives" differ from
centrist group members by the same amount in the opposite direction,
in that they are more favorable to inegalitarian and traditionalist
proposals and less favorable to egalitarian and vanguardist proposals.
Given this preference structure and a worker party versus boss
party system, workers of all ideologies are likely to remain loyal to the
worker party, while bosses of all ideologies remain loyal to the boss
party, unless ideological preferences are stronger than group-related
preferences. As before, this results in whichever party wins embracing
exploitative as well as efficient proposals. On the other hand, in a
division between a liberal party and a conservative party in which
ideology is weaker than group preference, the liberals have a base
from among the most left-of-center bosses and workers, while the
conservatives can count on the vote of the most right-of-center. The
election is decided by the swing votes of the centrists, who have the
same preferences as in the initial example. Given those preferences
and the need to compete for the votes of centrist workers and bosses,
both liberal and conservative parties should jettison exploitative
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proposals to maximize their vote. Thus, given a plausible assumption
that ideology is weaker in determining preferences than group
affiliation, the superiority of ideological politics over group-based
politics in eliminating exploitation remains.
Without trying to prove the point formally, we would assert
that the superiority of group-splitting politics to group-based voting as
a means of countering exploitation is quite a robust result. That
superiority is greatest in a situation in which voters have strong group-
based preferences and weak or nonexistent ideological ones. But in a
scenario like the previous one, where ideology as well as group
affiliation exercises a significant influence on preferences, the value of
group-splitting politics in checking exploitation persists. Given some
plausible assumptions about preferences, the efficiency edge of group-
splitting organizational politics over group-based politics is quite
clear-cut.
IV. REFINING THE BASIC MODEL OF EMPLOYEE VOTING
In considering how our model applies to real world
circumstances, there is a serious issue that needs to be addressed. The
efficiency of group-splitting voting depends on whether a value-
enhancing competition for votes across group lines is actually
attainable, either from the existing preferences of workers and bosses
or because of rules on how a workplace voting system must operate.
If it is not, the efficiency advantages of group-splitting voting are
hypothetical rather than real ones. Skeptics about democratizing
organizations are likely to take the position that exactly such a
situation obtains in firms, in that the preference structure of employees
is not conducive to the success of group-splitting politics.
The skeptics' reaction may well be correct, given the
assumptions of the model we have laid out. Suppose parties are
allowed to compete in a firm with the preference structure initially
described, in which preferences are solely a function of group
membership. Given these preferences, all workers will support an
exploitative worker's party over an efficient liberal or conservative
party, and all bosses will similarly support an exploitative bosses'
party over either ideological party. Simply put, unconstrained
democracy does not work well given the postulated preference
structures of workers and bosses in the original model.
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The failure of democratic politics to produce a desirable
outcome in this case is a function of the stark differences in
preferences between workers and bosses that are assumed to exist in
the firm. Because firms (and other hierarchical institutions) are
organized along much starker and simpler group lines than society as a
whole, in which there are many cross-cutting hierarchies (of class,
gender, race, sexual orientation, liberal-conservative ideology, and so
on), it is quite likely that there are indeed major differences between
the preferences of managers and subordinates in most firms. That
means that it is reasonable to guess that unconstrained democratic
politics within a firm would produce group-based rather than group-
splitting parties, and an attendant high level of inefficient exploitation.
Unless this situation can be addressed, there would be no way to
formulate an economically-based justification for multi-stakeholder
voting. Therefore, we will now turn to the task of suggesting how to
structure democratic politics within a firm so as to obtain
economically efficient outcomes.
A. BRINGING INVESTORS INTO THE MODEL
We will now modify the original model by assuming that the
two great classes of firm life are not managers and workers but
investors and employees (with employees including managers as well
as investors). In this version, the employees' group interest will be
assumed to be in maximizing the amount of profit accruing to them
from the firm. The investors' group interest is apparently parallel, in
that investors want to maximize the amount of firm profits accruing to
them. But there is a crucial difference between the two groups' time
preferences, which makes the comparison between group-based parties
of investors and employees work out very differently than the
comparison did for worker and boss parties. While both worker and
boss parties would be comparably inefficient, an investor party would,
as proponents of shareholder voting have argued, espouse a more
efficient agenda than a worker (or managerial) party.'
5
Employees who are not investors, even if they hope to stay
with the firm permanently, are concerned with maximizing their gains
from the firm over their working and retirement years. Investors, even
if they plan to sell imminently, are concerned with investor profits
15 See supra note 4,
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over the indefinite future, since the expectation of future profits drives
the current price of the company's shares. Given this difference in
time horizon, an investor party and an employee party have different
incentives. Specifically, the employees will be more prone to large-
scale exploitation of the investors than the investors will be of
comparable exploitation of the employees. Compared to employees,
investors don't have as significant an incentive to exploit because of
their residual claim on the firm's earnings. Exploitation reduces the
firm's earnings, and generally the investors' payoffs. Investor
strategies that may seem like exploitation within the firm itself may
well not be, when the effect on the social system as a whole is taken
into account. For example, consider a company in which the investors
decide that earnings will be maximized by licensing the brand and
laying off all the existing managers and workers. Even assuming the
earnings of the employees will be reduced by more than the earnings
of the investors will be increased, it is not clear that exploitation has
occurred. Other employees and managers, or at any rate other factors
of production, and/or consumers, will benefit from the change to a
licensing arrangement, and there is no reason to assume that these
benefits are any less than the losses to the firms' current employees.
In any event, firms that did not behave in such a profit-maximizing
manner would, under neoclassical economic theory, constitute
inefficient loci of capital allocation. In this sense, the proclivity of
investors to maximize firm gains over an indefinite term is congruent
with the overall capital allocation efficiency of an economy, which in
turn is presumed to result in optimal economic welfare for the society.
The resistance of investors to exploitative behavior should not
be overstated, though. Investor-driven restructurings that increase the
proportion of the firm's profit going to investors rather than to
employees can certainly be value-enhancing. But they can also be
inefficient. As discussed in our section defining efficiency, a key
reason why that is so is that investors, like other groups in a firm, very
often lack sufficient information to determine what policies will in fact
maximize firm earnings over time. Lacking such information, they
will tend to support policies that cut investors a larger slice of the pie
relative to managers and employees, but that may not in fact be
maximizing for the firm.
Contrary to the more extreme claims sometimes made for
investor control, we conclude that investors are not immune from
inefficient actions, given the high level of ignorance of long-term
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payoffs that we believe prevails in the real world and the tendency of
all groups to favor strategies enhancing their share of the pie.' 6 But,
for reasons outlined above, investor interests are aligned with the
efficiency interests of the firm in a more powerful way than those of
employees. An employee party's argument that a given proposal that
redistributes in favor of employees away from investors improves firm
efficiency may actually be correct in a given case. But the argument is
not likely one that an employee party can make credibly in the face of
investor disagreement. The employee party has incentives for large-
scale exploitation of investors, while the investor party has incentives
to support redistribution away from investors, as long as it increases
long-term investor value as reflected in current prices. Given these
circumstances, along with the murkiness and contingency of
determining what efficient policy actually is, an investor party's
efficiency arguments are likely to have credibility that an employee
party's arguments lack.
One response by advocates of workplace democracy to the
advantages of investor control over employee control for firm
efficiency has been to advocate changes in the composition of
investors. Possible strategies vary widely, ranging from
nationalization to employee ownership to distribution of shares to the
populace as a whole to public-private holding companies. 17  Though
we would not want to rule out the possibility that some of these
strategies may have value for organizational democracy, we are not
concerned for present purposes with making recommendations along
those lines. Instead, we want to suggest a different response to the
superiority of investor over employee control.
We believe that compared to the current regime of formal
investor control and day-to-day managerial control, democratic
competition that pits employees against investors would be deleterious
rather than healthy to a firm. 18 But a group-splitting democratic
16 Another reason for inefficient investor action exists if one assumes that investors
can "beat the market"by, for example, breaking implicit contracts with employees
without paying an offsetting price for that conduct in the future.
17 Given that a variety of other nations, especially in the developing world, have
corporate law regimes that are more in flux than that of the U.S., the contemporary
scholarship tends to have an international focus. See, e.g., William H. Simon, The
Legal Structure of the Chinese "Socialist Market" Enterprises, 21 IOWA J. CORP. L.
267, 270-272, 285-294 (1996).
18 Even assuming that it were possible to work out a scheme for voting that allowed
both shareholders and employees to participate and reconciled the "one person one
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competition between a "liberal" party that supports more egalitarian
distribution (and, in doing so, typically favors employees over
investors) and also vanguard reshapings of production (and, in doing
so, typically favors investors over employees) and a "conservative"
party that takes contrary positions may well promote efficiency,
compared to a regime of investor voting and managerial control. 19
B. AN INVESTOR-EMPLOYEE MODEL
Let's see how such a competition would work in the context of
investor-employee politics with equal groups of investors and
employees. Suppose, as in the example with boss-worker politics, that
there are competing liberal and conservative parties. The liberal party
supports egalitarian and vanguardist policies and the conservative
party supports inegalitarian and traditionalist policies, as before.
Recall that the policies are redistributive as well as efficient or
inefficient ones, in that there are contrasting welfare implications for
the investors and employees. Egalitarian and traditionalist proposals
transfer value from investors to employees, we will assume, while
inegalitarian and vanguardist proposals transfer value from employees
to investors.
Now assume there are two proposals in each of the categories.
As before, one proposal in each category is efficient and one is
inefficient. Assume that the "liberal" and "conservative" ideological
lines are arbitrary and that the preferences of investors and employees
are in fact solely determined by group membership. The results follow
as in the boss-worker model: both liberal and conservative parties will
compete to offer a compelling policy menu to members of both
groups. Dropping inefficient proposals is a good way to do so, since
such proposals hurt the party more in gaining support from the
vote" practice of standard elections with the "one share one vote" practice of
American shareholder elections.
19 Again, we are assuming away the problem of working out a voting scheme
incorporating both employees and investors. We acknowledge that working out such
a plan is a major analytical issue. We suspect that a two-party system in which a
successful candidate must receive more than a certain proportion (e.g. 1/3) of votes
from each of the categories of managers, workers, and investors, combined with a
default rule that if no such candidate emerges the winner is chosen according to a
traditional investor-only vote, may well be the most practical way to implement
multi-stakeholder voting. But we leave the issue of proposing a specific voting plan
for future reflection and research by ourselves and others.
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disadvantaged group than they help it in gaining support from the
advantaged group. As long as both liberal and conservative parties
are seeking and receiving a significant share of the votes from both
investors and employees rather than becoming de facto group parties,
the incentive to weed out inefficient proposals prevails, as it did in the
earlier example involving workers and bosses.
By comparison with a regime of investor control, democratic
competition between group-splitting parties looks quite good. Given
their imperfect knowledge, investors with sole control will put into
effect inefficient inegalitarian and vanguardist proposals as well as
efficient ones, while party competition will eliminate these inefficient
proposals, as well as inefficient egalitarian and traditionalist ones.
Investors will not put efficient egalitarian and traditionalist proposals
into effect. On the other hand, a "liberal" party will carry out an
efficient egalitarian change and a "conservative" party will carry out
an efficient traditionalist one (although these policies will not be
carried out at the same time, as long as we assume that parties are
ideologically committed and do not steal other parties' platforms).
Group-splitting democracy does not dominate investor control,
though. In terms of the model, investor control, unlike democratic
ideological politics, insures efficient inegalitarian and vanguardist
changes. It is empirically conceivable that the efficient inegalitarian
and vanguardist policies that investor control insures are much more
important than the efficient egalitarian and traditionalist ones that
democracy with employee voting would allow. It is further possible
that the inefficient inegalitarian and vanguardist policies that also go
along with investor control but are prevented by ideological
democracy are fairly infrequent and minimally deleterious. Given
these possibilities, investor control might conceivably be more
efficient than ideological democracy, given the model's assumptions.
But these are only possibilities; if the value of efficient egalitarian and
traditionalist policies that firms miss out on under employee control is
considerable, or if inefficient inegalitarian and vanguardist policies are
a significant problem, ideological democracy will be a better bet for
the firm than investor control.
As in our first model of worker-boss politics, a major difficulty
for employee-investor democracy lies in creating the conditions for it
to flourish. Unconstrained democratic politics in a two-class system in
which investors have sharply different preferences from employees
will lead to group-based rather than group-splitting politics, and to
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outcomes inferior to those obtained under a group-splitting system.
Ideology must have some reality as a factor in influencing people's
preferences; otherwise, voting will simply become group-based and
foster suboptimal outcomes.
V. CONCLUSION
A firm can benefit from multi-stakeholder voting, including
employee voting, if that voting is group-splitting rather than group-
based. That is the central message of our models, and it is one that we
believe has significant applicability to the question of whether
experiments in multi-stakeholder voting should be undertaken, and
how such voting should be structured. To the extent that multi-
stakeholder voting is group-based voting, it will have inefficient
outcomes. On the other hand, to the extent that the contending sides in
such voting take positions that cut across the fundamental group-based
interests of investors, managers, and workers, multi-stakeholder voting
has promise from an efficiency perspective.
We readily acknowledge that there are potential difficulties
with multi-stakeholder voting, even assuming that such voting is
group-splitting rather than group-based. Among these issues are the
following: 1) are workplaces more reliant on shared values than a
political unit such as a town or country, and hence inappropriate
venues for the value conflict of electoral politics with diverse
groups?;20 2) would the benefits derived from hierarchy be
undermined by voting for corporate leadership?; and 3) how would
one design a workable voting system incorporating investors,
managers, and workers?
Although we regard all these issues as serious, we do not see
them as foreclosing the potential value of experiments in multi-
stakeholder voting. We also believe that multi-stakeholder voting has
the potential to realize benefits beyond those discussed in our models.
In addition to comporting with democratic values and fulfilling a
longtime aspiration of reformers, such voting would allow for more
complex alliances than are possible under shareholder only elections
plus day-to-day managerial control. Inefficient decisions will be less
endemic, all else equal, if the governance structure allows all three of
the firm's major groups to form alliances with another group to check
20 This issue relates to the concerns expressed by MANSBRIDGE, supra note 6, about
adversarial democracy.
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inefficiency on the part of the third. Such two-group alliances may of
course be used for exploitation as well to check exploitation.
However, given that some such alliances are possible if all groups are
able to combine, efficient outcomes can be reached that cannot be if
some groups are unable to ally. The current system provides strong
opportunities for investors and managers to ally to counter
opportunistic conduct by subordinates, which is an important virtue
that needs to be retained in some form in an alternative system. There
are also opportunities for managers and workers to ally against
overreaching investors under the current system. What the current
governance system of investor voting and effective managerial control
does not offer, however, are effective formal or informal means for
investors and employees to ally against managerial inefficiency. A
multi-stakeholder electoral system, as much as it also serves other
purposes, can be described as a way of permitting and facilitating
alliances of investors and employees that would compete against the
established alliances of investors with managers and managers with
workers, and in so doing would enhance firm efficiency.
The question of whether employees should have a vote in
determining corporate leadership is an important and complex one.
We have argued that the conventional practice of allowing only
shareholders to vote makes sense when voting is based on group
affiliations. In such a situation, employee voting would lead to a
polarized politics with a high potential for group-based exploitation.
However, employee voting has promise from an efficiency perspective
if the major groups within a firm are all split rather than united by
contending liberal and conservative sides. In that case, employee
voting can reduce suboptimal outcomes by opening the door to
efficient policy alternatives that are foreclosed in a regime in which
only shareholders vote.
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